THE GLORIOUS FIRST OF JUNE: THE BATTLE AND THE CONSEQUENCES
THE GLORIOUS FIRST OF JUNE: THE BATTLE AND THE CONSEQUENCES
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times.” Charles Dickens wrote these words in 1859 to open A Tale of Two Cities, a historical novel set in London and Paris during the years leading to and through the French Revolution. Those same words also describe the condition of the British and French navies in the years surrounding the battle later called The Glorious First of June.
In the years before the battle, Britain endured the humiliation of losing the American Revolution. However, Admiral Rodney helped restore national confidence by defeating the French at the Battle of the Saints. That victory reinforced British perceptions of naval superiority. Britain gained even more prestige in 1793 when Admiral Hood captured Toulon and the French Mediterranean fleet without firing a shot.
France, however, suffered deeply from Toulon’s loss, and the French government had largely brought the defeat upon itself. The people of Toulon and many sailors acted out of fear of Jacobin rule, not because Britain had outmaneuvered them militarily.
On November 16, 1793, the French government appointed Louis-Thomas, Comte Villaret de Joyeuse, as commander of the French Atlantic fleet at Brest. Soon afterward, France dispatched Rear Admiral Pierre Jean Vanstabel to America to escort a convoy of merchant ships carrying desperately needed food back to France.
Lord Howe had maintained a blockade of Brest in hopes of intercepting Vanstabel’s convoy. On May 21, 1794, sustained westerly winds forced Howe off station. He sailed into open water just one day before Villaret received word that the convoy was approaching within less than a fortnight of Brest. Villaret knew the British fleet waited nearby, and he had no choice but to take his ships to sea. As he later confessed, he could not allow Howe to capture the convoy. Failure would have placed his own life in jeopardy, as the guillotine awaited commanders who failed the revolutionary government.
Howe returned to Brest at the first opportunity and found the harbor empty. He immediately began searching for Villaret. On May 28, 1794, the fleets sighted one another. Over the next four days, both sides maneuvered and skirmished. Howe eventually gained the tactical advantage when he positioned his fleet to execute a new maneuver: breaking through the French line at multiple points. Although only part of the British fleet fully carried out the maneuver, it succeeded.
Britain achieved an overwhelming tactical victory. The British captured seven French ships of the line, though one later sank. The French suffered approximately 4,200 killed or wounded, and the British took another 3,300 prisoners.
Despite suffering the greatest French naval defeat since 1692, Villaret accomplished his primary objective: protecting Vanstabel’s convoy. The convoy arrived safely on June 14, 1794, the same day Villaret’s fleet returned. By fulfilling his mission, Villaret secured a strategic victory even in defeat.
Although both fleets claimed success, the battle functioned as a Pyrrhic victory for each side. In France, the government and public initially celebrated the convoy’s arrival and emphasized strategic success. However, the revolutionary tribunal later prosecuted several French captains for alleged treason. These accusations often stemmed from incompetence rather than betrayal. The navy and anti-Jacobin politicians responded with anger, and this pattern of political punishment contributed to growing resistance against Robespierre and Jacobin rule. Ultimately, these events helped weaken the regime and hastened its downfall.
Britain suffered consequences as well. Although the British government executed no leaders after the battle, the engagement exposed the hypocrisy of Jacobin leadership. Ironically, that exposure contributed to long-term stability in France, which later posed a greater threat to Britain.
The battle also severely strained British manpower. During the engagement, the fleet lost many senior officers through death, injury, or exhaustion. However, disease proved even more devastating than combat. Many French prisoners carried typhus, and their captivity exposed British sailors to the illness. Between the fleet’s return and the end of the epidemic, typhus incapacitated roughly 800 British sailors. When combined with 1,098 killed or wounded, the battle and its aftermath created a serious manpower crisis.
Britain also gained less material benefit than expected from capturing French ships. Although British forces captured six ships, only three ever entered British service. Repairing and outfitting them cost £81,412, an amount equal to building two new ships. As a result, the capture produced a net gain closer to one ship than six.
Political controversy followed in Britain as well. Anti-war politicians such as Norfolk, Stanhope, Grafton, Wilberforce, Sheridan, and Lansdowne seized on these costs and setbacks to criticize William Pitt’s government, which they viewed as increasingly committed to war.
In conclusion, both Britain and France used The Glorious First of June to strengthen morale and promote the legitimacy of their governments. Yet the battle also created lasting consequences that undermined both fleets. Admiral Jervis captured this truth when he observed, “I am grieved to learn that the consequences were not so propitious as the resolution of the parties who were engaged most merited.”
Bibliography
Rodger, N. A. M. The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2004.
Willis, Sam. The Glorious First of June: Fleet Battle in the Reign of Terror. London: Quercus, 2012.
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